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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                            __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
         In a civil rights complaint brought against the City of 
Philadelphia and certain police officers, the parents and legal 
guardians of Samantha Kneipp allege that late one January evening 
when Kneipp, in an obvious state of severe inebriation, was 
attempting to return on foot to her nearby apartment, the police 
officers stopped her and sent her on alone. 
         We hold that, if proven, the facts alleged will sustain 
a prima facie case of a violation of Kneipp's Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process right and her liberty interest 
in personal security under the theory that city police officers 
increased the risk of harm to Kneipp which ultimately resulted in 
the severe damages she sustained.  In so holding, we adopt the 
"state-created danger" theory as a viable mechanism for 
establishing a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.    
On remand, the municipal liability claims against the City should 




         The events leading to the tragedy that befell Samantha 
Kneipp began in the late evening of January 23, 1993.  Samantha 
and her husband Joseph were returning on foot from a night of 
drinking at a tavern in Bucks County, Pennsylvania.  According 
to Joseph, Samantha was visibly intoxicated--she smelled of 
urine, staggered when she walked and, at times, was unable to 
walk without assistance.  Joseph testified that he had to carry 
Samantha a portion of the way home. 
         Shortly after midnight, now January 24, 1993, 
Philadelphia Police Officer Wesley Tedder stopped the Kneipps for 
causing a disturbance on the highway.  At this point, the 
Kneipps were only one-third of a block from their home.  Unable 
to stand by herself, Samantha was leaning on Officer Tedder's 
car.  Officer Tedder questioned Samantha and Joseph separately; 
he stated in his deposition that he smelled alcohol on Samantha 
and found both of them to be intoxicated.  He gave Samantha 
instructions to go stand somewhere, which she did not follow.  
Joseph told Officer Tedder that he just wanted to get his wife 
into their apartment.   
         Shortly after Officer Tedder stopped the Kneipps, three 
other police officers arrived separately at the scene and 
positioned themselves across the street from Officer Tedder.  
Joseph left Officer Tedder and crossed over to the other side of 
the street where the police cars were situated.  Joseph told one 
of the officers that he had a babysitter watching his son and 
that he was supposed to be home by now.  Joseph then asked the 
officer if he could go home, to which the officer replied, "Yeah, 
sure."  When Joseph left to walk home, Samantha was leaning on 
the front of a police car in the presence of several police 
officers.  Joseph testified that he assumed that because Samantha 
was drunk, the police officers were going to take her either to 
the hospital or to the police station.  His thoughts at the time 
were that Samantha should not be left alone in her inebriated 
state and that the police officers would take care of her, so he 
proceeded home without her.  Officer Tedder, however, sent 
Samantha home alone; she never reached her apartment building. 
         When his wife did not return to their apartment, Joseph 
went out to look for her.  He saw a police car parked in a 
Sunoco station not far from his apartment building.  As Joseph 
approached the car, he discovered Officer Tedder inside, and 
asked him if he had locked up Samantha or had taken her to the 
hospital.  According to Joseph, Officer Tedder told him "to get 
out of here before he locked [him] up."  Because of a previous 
experience with the Philadelphia police, Joseph took Officer 
Tedder's remark seriously and left.  Joseph decided to continue 
looking for Samantha, and as he proceeded in the direction of a 
neighborhood convenience store, he thought he saw someone 
resembling Samantha, dressed in similar clothing, getting into an 
orange car.  Because of Samantha's previous infidelity, Joseph 
thought that if it were Samantha, she was cheating on him again 
and would return when she was done.  Joseph was never certain, 
however, that the woman he saw entering the car was Samantha.  
Joseph decided to forego his search and returned home. 
         At approximately 1:51 a.m., Officer Francis Healy 
responded to a radio call reporting that an individual was found 
unconscious at the bottom of an embankment next to a parking lot 
at the shopping plaza across the street from the Kneipps' home.  
The unconscious individual was Samantha Kneipp.  Joseph was 
awakened around 4:00 a.m. by Officer Healy, who informed him that 
Samantha had fallen and was in the hospital.   
         As a result of her exposure to the cold, Samantha 
suffered hypothermia, which caused a condition known as anoxia.  
Consequently, the anoxia resulted in permanent brain damage 
impairing many basic body functions. 
         Samantha's legal guardians instituted this civil rights 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Philadelphia 
and several police officers, alleging that the police officers 
were aware of Samantha's intoxication and "the potential for her 
to suffer harm because of her profoundly impaired faculties."  By 
voluntarily assuming responsibility for her protection when they 
told Joseph he could leave, it was alleged that the officers 
affirmatively created a danger and increased the risk that 
Samantha might be injured when they later abandoned her.  It is 
further alleged that the police conduct made Samantha "more 
vulnerable" [by] . . . "interfer[ing] with the efforts of Joseph 
[ ] to assist his wife to safety."  Because the police officers 
acted with "deliberate or reckless indifference, callous 
disregard, or in such an arbitrary or abusive manner so as to 
shock the conscience," the legal guardians maintained that 
Samantha was deprived of her right to substantive due process and 
her liberty interest in personal security in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
         In addition, the legal guardians contended that the 
City of Philadelphia, by acquiescing in the longstanding policy, 
custom, or practice of not posting "activity credits" for taking 
intoxicated pedestrians into custody, and by failing to 
adequately train its police officers in the proper care of 
intoxicated persons, acted with "deliberate or reckless 
indifference, callous disregard, or in an arbitrary and abusive 
manner so as to shock the conscience," thereby also violating 
Samantha's right to substantive due process and her liberty 
interest in personal security. 
         In granting the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, the district court found that the legal guardians had 
failed to prove a constitutional violation under either the 
"special relationship" test or the state-created danger theory.  
The court also denied a motion for reconsideration.   
         The legal guardians filed a timely notice of appeal 
from the order of the district court.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291; we exercise de novo review of the 
district court's grant of summary judgment.  Ideal Dairy Farms, 
supra; Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1294 (3d Cir. 1996). 
                
                               II. 
         We begin our analysis with a discussion of the 
requirements for establishing a constitutional claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  The pertinent language of section 1983 states: 
         Every person who, under color of any statute, 
         ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
         any State or Territory or the District of 
         Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
         subjected, any citizen of the United States 
         or other person within the jurisdiction 
         thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
         privileges, or immunities secured by the 
         Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
         party injured in an action at law, suit in 
         equity, or other proper proceeding for 
         redress. 
 
Section 1983 does not, by its own terms, create substantive 
rights; it provides only remedies for deprivations of rights 
established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws.  Baker 
v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979); Mark v. Borough of 
Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 
165 (1995) (citation omitted).  In order to establish a section 
1983 claim, a plaintiff "must demonstrate a violation of a right 
secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States 
[and] that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person 
acting under color of state law."  Mark, 51 F.3d at 1141 (quoting 
Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993)).  Here, 
Samantha Kneipp's legal guardians have alleged that the City and 
police officers violated Samantha's right to substantive due 
process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
         In DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep't of Social Serv., 489 
U.S. 189, 197 (1989), the Supreme Court considered whether the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the 
state an affirmative duty to protect an individual against 
private violence where a special relationship exists between the 
state and the private individual.  The Court found that the 
special relationship which would impose affirmative duties of 
care and protection on the state existed only in certain limited 
circumstances, such as when the state takes a person into its 
custody and holds him there against his will.  Id. at 199-201.  
The Court explained: 
         In the substantive due process analysis, it 
         is the State's affirmative act of restraining 
         the individual's freedom to act on his own 
         behalf--through incarceration, 
         institutionalization, or other similar 
         restraint of personal liberty--which is the 
         "deprivation of liberty" triggering the 
         protections of the Due Process Clause, not 
         its failure to act to protect his liberty 
         interests against harms inflicted by other 
         means.                            
 
Id. at 200 (footnote omitted).  Applying this principle to the 
facts in DeShaney, the Court did not find a due process violation 
as the harms suffered by the child occurred while he was in the 
custody of his father, not in the state's custody.  Id. at 201.    
         In the case before us, we agree with the district court 
that the special relationship required by DeShaney did not exist 
between Samantha and the police officers.  We disagree, however, 
with the holding of the district court insofar as it adds a 
special relationship requirement to the state-created danger 
theory.  In DeShaney, the Supreme Court left open the possibility 
that a constitutional violation might have occurred despite the 
absence of a special relationship when it stated:  "While the 
State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the 
free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do 
anything to render him any more vulnerable to them."  Id. at 201.  
Several of our sister courts of appeals have cited this comment 
by the Court as support for utilizing a state-created danger 
theory to establish a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.  See Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 n. 7 (10th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 924 (1996); Dwares v. City of New 
York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 
1122, 1125 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 947 (1993); Freeman 
v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990).  Moreover, two 
other courts of appeals, in decisions predating DeShaney, 
recognized the state-created danger theory as a basis for 
establishing a constitutional claim under section 1983.  SeeCornelius v. 
Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 
F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). 
         In previous cases, we have considered the possible 
viability of the state-created danger theory as a mechanism for 
establishing a constitutional claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Mark, 51 F.3d at 1152 (citing D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area 
Vo. Tech. School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992) (in banc), 
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993)); see also Brown v. Grabowski, 
922 F.2d 1097, 1114-16 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 
1218 (1991).  Until now, we have not, however, been presented 
with the appropriate factual background to support a finding that 
state actors created a danger which deprived an individual of her 
Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.  Samantha 
Kneipp's case presents the right set of facts which, if believed, 
would trigger the application of the state-created danger theory.  
We turn first to our previous decisions in this area. 
         In the 1990 case of Brown v. Grabowski, supra, Deborah 
Evans had been abducted and murdered by her former live-in 
boyfriend, Clifton McKenzie.  Prior to the abduction, McKenzie 
had held Evans hostage for three days, during which he repeatedly 
threatened and sexually assaulted her.  Although Evans and her 
family reported this information to the local police, criminal 
charges were never filed.  Shortly thereafter, Evans was abducted 
and imprisoned in the trunk of her car where she froze to death.  
The personal representative of Evans' estate filed a civil rights 
complaint against the borough and employees of the police 
department alleging, inter alia, that Detective Grabowski, in 
failing to file criminal charges against McKenzie and in failing 
to inform Evans of her right as a victim of domestic violence to 
obtain a restraining order against McKenzie, violated her 
constitutional rights to due process and of access to the civil 
and criminal courts. 
         The plaintiff in Brown relied upon Wood v. Ostrander, 
879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), and Cornelius v. Town of Highland 
Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), in support of her argument 
that the state-created danger theory was a viable basis for 
imposing constitutional liability under section 1983.  In Wood, a 
police officer stranded the female passenger of a drunk driver 
along the side of the road in a high-crime area at 2:30 a.m.  
While undertaking the five mile walk to her home, the passenger 
accepted a ride from a stranger who took her to a secluded area 
and raped her.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
that the plaintiff had raised a triable issue of fact as to 
whether the police officer "`affirmatively placed [her] in a 
position of danger.'"  879 F.2d at 589-90 (citation omitted).  
The court further held that the plaintiff was distinguishable 
from the general public and, therefore, the police had a duty to 
offer her some degree of peace and safety.  Id. at 590 (citing 
White v. Rockford, 592 F.2d 381, 384 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1979)). 
         The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 
Cornelius validated the use of the "special danger" theory as a 
basis for establishing a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  In that case, Mrs. Cornelius was abducted at knife-point 
by two prison inmates assigned to a community work squad at the 
town hall where she worked.  Mrs. Cornelius was held hostage and 
terrorized for three days before being abandoned in another 
state.  She subsequently commenced a civil rights action against 
various prison and town officials, alleging they owed her a duty 
to assign only properly classified prison inmates, i.e., 
nonviolent-offenders, to the community work squads and to provide 
adequately skilled and trained officials to supervise the prison 
work squads.  880 F.2d at 352.  In concluding that a triable 
issue of fact existed precluding summary judgment, the court 
found that the defendants affirmatively created a dangerous 
situation by establishing the work squad and assigning inmates to 
work around town hall.  Id. at 356.  Moreover, because of her 
position as town clerk, Mrs. Cornelius was regularly exposed to 
prison work squads, thereby increasing her vulnerability to harm.  
Id.  These two factors taken together "effectively operated to 
place [Mrs. Cornelius] in a position of danger distinct from that 
facing the public at large" and were sufficient to impose a duty 
under section 1983.  Id. at 357.   
         The court of appeals in Cornelius also imposed a nexus 
element to establish a triable issue as to special danger.  
Citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), the court 
held that there must be a sufficiently close nexus between the 
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's alleged due process 
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment to establish a 
constitutional claim based on the special danger theory.  880 
F.2d at 353 and 358.  The court of appeals found the employees at 
the town hall, including Mrs. Cornelius, "were well within the 
identifiable radius of harm known to defendants," and thus 
concluded that these facts created a triable issue as to special 
danger.  Id. at 359. 
         We found Wood and Cornelius to be distinguishable from 
the facts in Brown -- in the former cases, the state defendants 
affirmatively acted to create the danger to the victims; the 
plaintiff in Brown, however, failed to offer any evidence that 
the police officers acted to create or to exacerbate the danger 
that the former boyfriend posed to the victim.  922 F.2d at 1116.  
The plaintiff demonstrated only that Detective Grabowski failed 
to advise the victim of her right to seek a protective order.  
Id.  Thus, we concluded in Brown that the plaintiff had failed to 
establish a cognizable constitutional claim under section 1983. 
         In 1992, sitting in banc, we considered the state- 
created danger theory in D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area 
Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).  There 
two female students at a public high school alleged that they 
were physically, verbally and sexually molested by male students 
in a unisex bathroom and in a darkroom, which were parts of the 
graphic arts classroom.  The students' parents brought a civil 
rights action against the school district and several school 
officials and employees, alleging that the defendants created the 
danger that resulted in a violation of the plaintiffs' 
constitutional rights.  In support of this claim, plaintiffs 
argued that the school defendants "`created a climate which 
facilitated sexual and physical abuse of students'" and, having 
thrust plaintiffs into this situation, "were obligated to protect 
them from violations of their personal bodily integrity by other 
students who were also under defendants' control."  Id. at 1373. 
         In D.R., we recognized that the state-created danger 
theory had been utilized by several courts of appeals to find a 
constitutional violation under section 1983 in non-custodial 
settings.  Id.  We read the post-DeShaney decisions to frame the 
inquiry as "whether the state actors involved affirmatively acted 
to create plaintiff's danger, or to render him or her more 
vulnerable to it."  Id. (citation omitted).  We continued that 
"[l]iability under the state created danger theory is predicated 
upon the states' affirmative acts which work to plaintiffs' 
detriments in terms of exposure to danger."  Id. at 1374.  We 
quoted the following comment from the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit: 
              We do not want to pretend that the line 
         between action and inaction, between 
         inflicting and failing to prevent the 
         infliction of harm, is clearer than it is.  
         If the state puts a man in a position of 
         danger from private persons and then fails to 
         protect him, it will not be heard to say that 
         its role was merely passive; it is as much an 
         active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him 
         into a snake pit.   
 
Id. (quoting Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 
1982)). 
         We concluded in D.R. that the facts presented did not 
show that the defendants created the students' danger, increased 
their risk of harm, or made them more vulnerable to the assaults.  
Id.  Moreover, we found the state-created danger line of cases to 
be factually distinguishable in a critical respect:  in the cases 
where the courts imposed a constitutional duty based on a state- 
created danger, the state had affirmatively acted to create the 
danger.  Id.  In D.R., we found that the harm to the students 
resulted solely from the acts of private individuals, and not 
from the type of intermingling between state conduct and private 
violence that imposed liability in Wood and Cornelius.  Id. at 
1375.  The acts or omissions of the school defendants in D.R., we 
concluded, did not rise to the level of affirmative action 
required to impose liability under the state-created danger 
theory. 
         In the 1994 case of Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 
1296 (3d Cir. 1994) (in banc) (Fagan II), the plaintiffs claimed 
their constitutional rights to substantive due process were 
violated when police officers recklessly conducted a high speed 
pursuit in violation of the Attorney General's guidelines.  The 
plaintiffs also alleged that the municipal defendant was liable 
because it followed a policy of not properly training and 
supervising police officers in conducting high-speed pursuits, 
and because it followed a policy of not enforcing the pursuit 
guidelines.  The sole issue before us was the appropriate 
standard by which to judge police conduct in pursuit cases 
alleging a violation of substantive due process.  Id. at 1299.  
We held that the appropriate standard to be applied in police 
pursuit cases involving an alleged violation of substantive due 
process is the "shocks the conscience" test.  Id. at 1303. 
         In Fagan II, we declined to consider the applicability 
of the DeShaney line of cases which imposed a constitutional duty 
in limited situations, i.e., special relationship or custody 
cases, to police pursuit cases, as this issue was not raised by 
the parties or addressed by the district court.  Id. at 1308 n.9.  
Moreover, the plaintiffs in Fagan II did not advance the state- 
created danger theory as a basis for establishing a 
constitutional violation.  Thus, neither the district court nor 
our court had the opportunity in Fagan II to review the viability 
of the state-created danger theory.  We believe that the Fagan IIshocks 
the conscience standard is limited to police pursuit 
cases, and accordingly, we are not bound to follow that standard 
in the case before us. 
         In the 1995 case of Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, supra, 
we suggested a test for applying the state-created danger theory.  
We found that cases predicating constitutional liability on a 
state-created danger theory have four common elements: 
         (1) the harm ultimately caused was 
         foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the state 
         actor acted in willful disregard for the 
         safety of the plaintiff; (3) there existed 
         some relationship between the state and the 
         plaintiff; (4) the state actors used their 
         authority to create an opportunity that 
         otherwise would not have existed for the 
         third party's crime to occur. 
 
51 F.3d at 1152.  We further noted that "[t]he cases where the 
state-created danger theory was applied were based on discrete, 
grossly reckless acts committed by the state or state actors 
using their peculiar positions as state actors, leaving a 
discrete plaintiff vulnerable to foreseeable injury."  Id. at 
1153.  Those courts which have recognized the state-created 
danger theory have employed a deliberate indifference standard.  
Id. at 1152 (quoting Johnson v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 
38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1361 
(1995); Wood, 879 F.2d at 588; Cornelius, 880 F.2d at 350). 
         We again declined to adopt the state-created danger 
theory in Mark because its facts were dissimilar to the courts of 
appeals cases which upheld its use.  Id. at 1152.  The alleged 
constitutional violation in Mark arose from the borough's 
"failure to follow adequate policies to ensure that applicants to 
the fire department were screened sufficiently for tendencies 
towards arson."  Id. at 1140.  We concluded that when the alleged 
violation involved a policy directed at the public in general, 
such as the one at issue in Mark, the basis for the state-created 
danger theory was obviated insofar as the defendant lacked 
specific knowledge of the plaintiffs' condition, and a 
relationship between the defendants and plaintiffs did not exist.  
Id. at 1153. 
         We turn now to the unique facts presented in the case 
before us. 
 
                               III. 
         We begin by applying the four common elements we set 
forth in Marks for the state-created danger theory.  First, the 
injuries to Samantha were foreseeable -- Dr. Saferstein stated in 
his report that at a blood alcohol level of .25%, Samantha's 
muscular coordination was seriously impaired.  Joseph's testimony 
as to how he had to help his wife walk, even carry her at times, 
also tends to show that Samantha's ability to walk was impaired.  
A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that in Samantha's 
state of intoxication, she would be more likely to fall and 
injure herself if left unescorted than someone who was not 
inebriated.  Based on the facts and inferences most favorable to 
the legal guardians, we hold that a reasonable jury could find 
that the harm likely to befall Samantha if separated from Joseph 
while in a highly intoxicated state in cold weather was indeed 
foreseeable. 
         Second, we find the plaintiffs have adduced sufficient 
evidence to raise a material issue as to whether Officer Tedder 
acted in willful disregard for Samantha's safety.  The plaintiffs 
presented evidence regarding Samantha's level of intoxication and 
impairment; by Officer Tedder's own testimony, he admitted that 
he knew Samantha was drunk.  Moreover, Tedder's statement that he 
sent Samantha and Joseph home together is contradicted by the 
testimony of Joseph, Officer Healy and Tina Leone. 
         We also believe the legal guardians have proved the 
third element -- a relationship between the state and the person 
injured (here Officer Tedder and Samantha and Joseph Kneipp) 
during which the state places the victim in danger of a 
foreseeable injury.  Mark, 51 F.3d at 1153.  Here it is alleged 
that Officer Tedder, exercising his powers as a police officer, 
placed Samantha in danger of foreseeable injury when he sent her 
home unescorted in a visibly intoxicated state in cold weather.  
A reasonable jury could find that Officer Tedder exerted 
sufficient control over Samantha to meet the relationship 
requirement. 
         Finally, there is sufficient evidence in the summary 
judgment record to show that Officer Tedder and the other police 
officers used their authority as police officers to create a 
dangerous situation or to make Samantha more vulnerable to danger 
had they not intervened.  The conduct of the police, in allowing 
Joseph to go home alone and in detaining Samantha, and then 
sending her home unescorted in a seriously intoxicated state in 
cold weather, made Samantha more vulnerable to harm.  It is 
conceivable that, but for the intervention of the police, Joseph 
would have continued to escort his wife back to their apartment 
where she would have been safe.  A jury could find that Samantha 
was in a worse position after the police intervened than she 
would have been if they had not done so.  As a result of the 
affirmative acts of the police officers, the danger or risk of 
injury to Samantha was greatly increased.  Thus, we believe that 
a reasonable jury could find that the fourth and final 
requirement of Mark was satisfied here. 
         We find additional support for our position in the 
courts of appeals' decisions previously cited.  See Reed v. 
Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1127 (police officer who removed a sober 
driver and left behind a passenger whom he knew to be drunk with 
the keys to the car was subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d at 54 (police chief, by 
interfering with police officers' enforcement of restraining 
order, created the danger which resulted in the victims' deaths 
and thus deprived victims of their constitutional rights); White 
v. Rockford, 529 F.2d at 385 (police officers who arrested uncle 
for drag racing and left minor children alone in abandoned car on 
the side of a busy, limited-access highway in cold weather had 
deprived children of their constitutional rights to personal 
security where the abandonment resulted in physical and emotional 
injury to the children). 
         In contrast to the above cited authority stands the en 
banc decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit in Gregory v. City of Rogers, Arkansas, 974 F.2d 
1006 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 913 (1993).  In that 
case, the plaintiffs brought a civil rights action against the 
municipality and one of its police officers on the basis that 
defendants had a duty to provide for the safety of the passengers 
of a drinking group after the police arrested their designated 
driver on an outstanding warrant.  After detaining the designated 
driver along the road for several minutes, the police allowed the 
designated driver to drive the car to the police station.  The 
intoxicated passengers remained in the car, which was parked in 
front of the police station, while the designated driver cleared 
up the outstanding warrant inside the station with the police.  
After waiting approximately thirty minutes, one of the 
intoxicated passengers, the owner of the car, drove the car away 
and subsequently was involved in a one-car accident, killing 
himself and seriously injuring his passenger.  Plaintiffs 
contended that the police officer actively placed the passengers 
in danger by permitting them to stay in the car unattended while 
waiting for the designated driver at the police station "`in 
spite of their obviously intoxicated condition.'"   Id. at 1009- 
10. 
         In Gregory, the plaintiffs' argument turned on whether 
the police officer knew or should have known the passengers were 
intoxicated.  The court of appeals found that the plaintiffs 
failed to submit sufficient evidence which would lead a 
reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the police officer knew 
or should have known that the passengers were intoxicated and 
unfit to drive, and thus, upheld the district court's grant of 
summary judgment.  The court of appeals, however, did not end its 
analysis there.  It went on to say that even if the police 
officers knew the passengers were intoxicated, a reasonable jury 
could not find that the police officer affirmatively placed the 
passengers in danger by leaving them unattended in the car at the 
station.  Id. at 1011.  The court explained that it was the 
designated driver who placed the passengers in danger by leaving 
the keys in the car when he went into the police station.  Id. at 
1012.  To impose a duty on the police to take affirmative action 
to protect the passengers, the court held, would circumvent the 
general rule that plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right 
to be protected by the police against harm inflicted by third 
persons.  Id. (citing Wells v. Walker, 852 F.2d 368, 370 (8th 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989); DeShaney, 489 
U.S. at 195-96). 
         Gregory, however, is distinguishable from this case in 
two respects.  First the court of appeals in Gregory found that 
the police officer did not know that the passengers were 
intoxicated -- neither the testimony of the witnesses, nor the 
behavior of the two passengers observed during the traffic stop 
on the roadway indicated they were intoxicated.  In contrast 
here, Officer Tedder admitted that he knew Samantha was drunk at 
the time he was questioning her, and Samantha was observed 
staggering, walking and standing with difficulty, requiring that 
she lean on parked cars or be carried by her husband. 
         The second distinction is who created the danger -- in 
Gregory, the court found that the third party created the danger 
by leaving the keys in the car; in the case before us, the police 
officers intervened to cut off Samantha's private source of 
protection by giving Joseph permission to go home alone, thereby 
increasing the danger that Samantha would suffer harm in her 
visibly intoxicated state when they abandoned her.  The 
affirmative acts of the police officers here created a dangerous 
situation, requiring that they take additional measures to ensure 
Samantha's safety.  That they failed to take the appropriate 
measures, knowing that Samantha was severely intoxicated, shows 
that the police officers acted with reckless disregard for her 
safety.  On the other hand, the conduct of the police officer in 
Gregory did not rise to a level of recklessness.  He did not know 
the passengers were drunk; nor did he take any affirmative action 
to create the dangerous situation -- leaving the keys in the car.  
Put another way, the passengers in Gregory were never abandoned; 
all they had to do was remain in the safety of the car and await 
the return of their driver.  Samantha, however, was isolated from 
her husband and then abandoned by the police.  Clearly then, 
because of these two important distinctions, Gregory is not 
dispositive of the issue before us. 
         At oral argument, we requested counsel for both sides 
to submit a letter brief under Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) on the issue 
of whether the Philadelphia police officers have a duty to arrest 
an intoxicated person as a basis for imposing liability for a 
constitutional tort under section 1983.  We are convinced, after 
reviewing the pertinent caselaw, that no such duty exists in 
Pennsylvania.  Even so, the failure to arrest Samantha would 
not give rise to a constitutional claim, as liability under 
section 1983 can be predicated only on violations of "federal 
statutory or constitutional rights under color of state law."  
D.R., 972 F.2d at 1375 (citations omitted).  The illegal conduct 
under the state law cannot add to or subtract from the 
"constitutional validity `[of a state's actions].'"  Id.(citations 
omitted). 
         Under the particular circumstances of this case, we 
hold that the state-created danger theory is a viable mechanism 
for establishing a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
When viewed in the light most favorable to the legal guardians, 
the evidence submitted was sufficient to raise a triable issue of 
fact as to whether the police officers affirmatively placed 
Samantha in a position of danger.  The district court erred, 
therefore, in granting summary judgment for the defendant police 
officers based on its finding that a constitutional violation had 
not occurred. 
 
                               IV. 
         The plaintiffs also argue that liability should be 
imposed under section 1983 against the City of Philadelphia for 
constitutional violations as a result of the City's acquiescence 
in the longstanding policy, custom or practice of not granting 
"activity credits" for taking intoxicated individuals into 
custody, and its failure to adequately train its police officers 
in the proper care of intoxicated persons.  By so doing, the 
plaintiffs contend, the City acted with "deliberate or reckless 
indifference, callous disregard, or in an arbitrary and abusive 
manner so as to shock the conscience."  Consequently, Samantha's 
right to substantive due process and her liberty interest in 
personal security guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment were 
allegedly violated. 
         We do not believe the district court adequately 
considered the appropriate legal standard in granting the City's 
motion for summary judgment.  Although we feel compelled to set 
forth the appropriate legal standard, we decline to rule on 
whether it was met here, leaving that determination to the 
district court in the first instance. 
         The Supreme Court enunciated the rule for imposing 
liability against a municipality under section 1983 in Monell v. 
New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  The 
Court held in Monell that: 
         . . . a local government may not be sued 
         under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely 
         by its employees or agents.  Instead, it is 
         when execution of a government's policy or 
         custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by 
         those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said 
         to represent official policy, inflicts the 
         injury that the government as an entity is 
         responsible under § 1983. 
 
Id. at 694.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court expressly rejected 
the imposition of section 1983 liability against a municipality 
on a respondeat superior theory.  Id. at 691. 
         In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the 
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether liability can ever be 
imposed against a municipality under section 1983 for 
constitutional violations as a result of failing to train its 
police officers.  Mrs. Harris had been arrested and taken to the 
police station for processing where she "slumped to the floor" 
twice and spoke incoherently.  Medical assistance was never 
sought for her.  Following her release from custody, Mrs. Harris 
was taken to a hospital by her family, where she was diagnosed as 
suffering from several emotional injuries.  In concluding that 
section 1983 liability may attach to a municipality if it had a 
policy or custom of failing to train its employees and that 
failure caused the underlying constitutional violation, the 
Court rejected the City of Canton's argument that only 
unconstitutional policies are actionable under the civil rights 
statute.  Id. at 387.  As to the degree of fault required to 
impose liability for the municipality's inaction, the Court 
articulated the following rule:  "the inadequacy of police 
training may serve as the basis for section 1983 liability only 
where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to 
the rights of persons with whom the police came into contact."  
Id. at 388 (footnote omitted).  The Court further explained: 
         Only where a municipality's failure to train 
         its employees in a relevant respect evidences 
         a "deliberate indifference" to the rights of 
         its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be 
         properly thought of as a city "policy or 
         custom" that is actionable under § 1983 
         . . . .  Only where a failure to train 
         reflects a "deliberate" or "conscious" choice 
         by a municipality -- a "policy" as defined by 
         our prior cases -- can a city be liable for 
         such a failure under § 1983. 
 
Id. at 389.  In addition to proving deliberate indifference, the 
Court held that the plaintiffs must show that the "deficiency in 
training actually caused the police officers' indifference to 
[the individual's] medical needs."  Id. at 391. 
         Recently, we had the opportunity to examine the 
holdings of Monell and its progeny in Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 
___ F.3d ___, No. 95-3328, 1996 WL 406776 (3d Cir. July 22, 
1996).  In Beck, we were asked to decide whether sufficient 
evidence had been presented for a jury to infer that a 
municipality had adopted a custom of permitting its police 
officers to use excessive force in the performance of their 
duties.  Citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 
(1986), we noted that the Supreme Court recognized a "two-path 
track to municipal liability under § 1983," either through 
government policy or custom.  Beck, 1986 WL 406776, at *6.  We 
had previously set forth the parameters of a government policy or 
custom for section 1983 liability:  
         Policy is made when a "decisionmaker 
         possess[ing] final authority to establish 
         municipal policy with respect to the action" 
         issues an official proclamation, policy, or 
         edict.  A course of conduct is considered to 
         be a "custom" when, though not authorized by 
         law, "such practices of state officials [are] 
         so permanent and well settled" as to 
         virtually constitute law. 
 
Beck, id. (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 
1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).  Moreover, a 
prerequisite to establishing liability in either situation is a 
showing that a policymaker was responsible either for the policy 
or, through acquiescence, for the custom.  Id.  See also Jett v. 
Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); Bielevicz 
v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990). 
         In order to ascertain who is a policymaker, "a court 
must determine which official has final, unreviewable discretion 
to make a decision or take action."  Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481.  
We further held in Bielevicz that: 
         Under § 1983, only the conduct of those 
         officials whose decisions constrain the 
         discretion of subordinates constitutes the 
         acts of the municipality.  This does not 
         mean, however, that the responsible 
         decisionmaker must be specifically identified 
         by the plaintiff's evidence.  Practices "`so 
         permanent and well settled' as to have `the 
         force of law' [are] ascribable to municipal 
         decisionmakers." 
 
915 F.2d at 850 (citations omitted). 
         Proof only of the existence of an unlawful policy or 
custom is not sufficient, however, to impose municipal liability 
under section 1983.  Id.  A plaintiff must also establish that 
the government policy or custom was the proximate cause of the 
injuries sustained.  Id. (citation omitted).  "To establish the 
necessary causation, a plaintiff must demonstrate a `plausible 
nexus' or `affirmative link' between the municipality's custom 
and the specific deprivation of constitutional rights at issue."  
Id. (citation omitted).  To the extent that the "causal link" is 
not too attenuated, the jury must decide whether the government 
policy or custom proximately caused the constitutional violation.  
Id. 
         Here, the district court dismissed the municipal 
liability claims against the City of Philadelphia on the basis 
that the plaintiffs failed to establish an underlying 
constitutional violation pursuant to section 1983.  It does not 
appear that, in so ruling, the district court considered the 
substantive elements of the municipal liability claims -- whether 
(1) the City of Philadelphia's training program for handling 
intoxicated persons was adequate; (2) if the training program was 
inadequate, the City was deliberately indifferent to the 
deficiency; and, (3) the deficiency in the training actually 
caused the police officers' indifference to Samantha's 
intoxication and need for assistance.  The precedent in our 
circuit requires the district court to review the plaintiffs' 
municipal liability claims independently of the section 1983 
claims against the individual police officers, as the City's 
liability for a substantive due process violation does not depend 
upon the liability of any police officer.  Fagan v. City of 
Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (3d Cir. 1994) (Fagan I) (citing 
Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1063 (3d Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992)).  Accordingly, on 
remand, the district court must evaluate the municipal liability 
claims in light of the standards set forth above, notwithstanding 
the outcome as to the claims against the individual police 
officers. 
 
                                V. 
         In conclusion, we find that the evidence presented, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the legal guardians, 
together with all reasonable inferences on their behalf, could 
support a jury's verdict in their favor as to the constitutional 
violations alleged against the individual police officers.  We 
will, therefore, reverse the order of the district court granting 
summary judgment for the defendants and remand for trial on this 
issue, and for further consideration of the municipal liability 
claims against the City of Philadelphia in light of our opinion. 
_________________________ 
